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Abstract—Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged
as a promising solution to identify and authenticate Integrated
Circuits (ICs). In this paper, we propose a novel NAND-based
Set-Reset (SR) Flip-flop (FF) PUF design for security enclosures
of the area- and power-constrained Internet-of-Things (IoT) edge
node. Such SR-FF based PUF is constructed during a unique
race condition that is (normally) avoided due to inconsistency. We
have shown, when both inputs (S and R) are logic high (‘1’) and
followed by logic zero (‘0’), the outputsQ and Q can settle down to
either 0 or 1 or vice-versa depending on statistical delay variations
in cross-coupled paths. We incorporate the process variations
during SPICE-level simulations to leverage the capability of SR-FF
in generating the unique identifier of an IC. Experimental results
for 90nm, 45nm, and 32nm process nodes show the robustness
of SR-FF PUF responses in terms of uniqueness, randomness,
uniformity, and bit(s) biases. Furthermore, we perform physical
synthesis to evaluate the applicability of SR FF PUF on five designs
from OpenCores in three design corners. The estimated overhead
for power, timing, and area in three design corners are negligible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the horizontal business model and vertical disintegra-
tion of IC design, most of ICs’ manufacturing and testing of
fabless design houses are performed in foreign foundries. In the
heart of this design ecosystem, original IP owners face several
security challenges including overproduction, counterfeiting,
authentication, and trust in manufactured products. Among all
the possible existence of security solutions, Physical Unclon-
able Function (PUF) acts as one-way function that can map
certain stable inputs (challenges) to pre-specified outputs (re-
sponses). Although cryptography algorithms have been put into
practice to perform the authentication, they are difficult to up-
load due to recent attacks [1], [2]. Moreover, the deployment of
computationally intensive cryptographic algorithms in resource-
constrained IoT devices limit their wide adoption. In contrast,
PUF utilizes inherent silicon variations. If a similar design is
manufactured onto two different dies, process variations would
act differently within and across both dies and this forms the
basis for a PUF. Ideally, a PUF implementation should be low-
cost, tamper-evident, unclonable, and reproducible. The PUF
response also need to be invariant to environmental variations
In recent years, a wide variety of PUF architectures have been
investigated that can transform device properties (e.g. thresh-
old voltage, temperature, gate length, oxide thickness, edge
roughness) to a unique identifier of certain length. Metastability
in cross-coupled paths have been exploited to design PUF
with SR latch [3]–[5] and Ring Oscillator (RO) [6]. Although
latch-based PUF designs offer unique signatures to ICs, they
suffer from signal skew and delay imbalance in signal routing
paths and Error Correction Code (ECC) circuitry is commonly
employed to post-process the instable PUF responses [7]. On
the contrary, RO-PUF in [6] incurs significant area overhead
that includes a counter, an accumulator, and a shift register.
These serve as a motivation to harvest deep-metastability in
bi-stable memory, SR FF, to design a low-cost PUF and high-
quality CRPs.
In this paper, we design and analyze a novel SR FF based
PUF. For a NAND gate based SR FF, the input condition
for S(Set) = ‘1’ and R(Reset) = ‘1’ must be avoided as it
produces an inconsistent condition. When S=R=‘1’ is applied
followed by S=R=‘0’, the outputs Q and Q would undergo race
condition. Due to manufacturing variations, the state due to race
condition will settle in either ‘0’ or ‘1’. Further, due to intra-
chip process variations, some flip flops in a chip will settle
in ‘0’ state, while others will settle in ‘1’ state. In addition,
due to inter-chip variations, such signature will be different
across the chips. We investigate delay variations in NAND
gates of the feedback path that affect most the gate delay.
We validate the proposed idea with SPICE-level simulations
for 90nm, 45nm, and 32nm process nodes to establish the
robustness of the proposed PUF responses for 16-, 32-, 64-, and
128-bit responses. We also perform layout-level simulation with
foundry data on five designs that incorporate SR-FF and present
their figures of merit (power, timing, and area). In summary,
we present the following novel contributions:
• utilizes SR-FFs already present in the register of a design
without any ECC and helper data. The responses are free
from multiple key establishments round that can thwart
reliability based attack.
• input dependent random yet stable binary sequence aided
by unpredictable manufacturing variability. Depending on
input challenges, only a fraction of SR-FFs would be
utilized to create unique device signature. Therefore, it
would increase the attacker reverse engineering effort to
determine the exact location of such SR-FFs that partici-
pate in PUF responses generation.
• a centroid architecture such that surrounding transistor
variations would only affect PUF responses and evaluate
the associated overhead through layout-based synthesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides background on the types of PUFs using metastability.
Section III describes the construction of SR flip-flop based PUF
design. Section IV reports in detail the experimental results.
Finally, Section V draws the conclusion and future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A PUF is a digital fingerprint that serves as a unique identity
to silicon ICs and characterized by inter-chip and intra-chip
variations. Inter-chip offers the uniqueness of a PUF that
helps to conclude that the key produced for a die is different
from other keys. Intra-chip determines the reliability of the
key produced that should not change for multiple iterations
on the same die. For a signal, metastability occurs when
the specifications for setup and hold time are not met and
unpredictable random value appears at the output. Although
metastable is an unstable condition, due to process variations,
such metastability generates a stable but random state (either
‘0’ or ‘1’), which is not known apriori.
Transient Effect Ring Oscillator (TERO) PUF [6] utilizes
metastability to generate the responses with a binary counter,
accumulator, and shift register. Although the architecture is
scalable, it requires large hardware resources. Su et al. [5], [8]
presented cross-coupled logic gates to create a digital ID based
on threshold voltage. The architecture is composed of latch
followed by a quantizer and a readout circuit to produce the
PUF ID. However, readout circuit is generally expensive and
limits its application to the low-power device. FPGA-based SR-
latch PUF has been presented in [3], [4]. Due to temporal oper-
ating conditions, ECC is employed to reliably map one-to-one
challenge-response pair in both approaches. To alleviate power-
up values from memory-based PUF, registers based on edge-
triggered D-FF are proposed in [5], [9]. The authors suggested
to include an expensive synchronizer in Clock Domain Signal
(CDC) signals to get stable PUF response. A framework of
‘body-bias’ adjusted voltage on SR-latch timing using FD-SOI
technology is presented in [10]. To get correct PUF response,
authors employed buffers along the track of top and bottom of
latches that suffer from responses biasedness.
The majority of works utilizing metastability to design PUF
employ additional hardware to count the oscillation frequency.
Our work is unlike these previous studies in that it (a) employs
SR-FF to construct low-cost PUF and (b) reuses the SR-
FF already in the original IP by varying channel length and
temperature to account for intra- and inter-chip variations.
III. PROPOSED SR FLIP FLOP PUF
Our approach presents a PUF design that relies on the cross-
coupled path in an SR-FF configuration. Each bit of a PUF
response can be extracted from metastability induced random
value in the output (Q) due to a particular input sequence
at SR-FF. This random value would eventually evaluate to a
stable logic due to process variability. A clock enabled cross-
coupled NAND-based SR-FF construction is shown in Fig.
1. It does not require additional synchronizer to control the
input conditions. Set-Reset (SR) Latch has the forbidden input
combination, namely, S=R=1 which results in both Q and Q
equal to 1. After S=R=1 input, if we lower both inputs (S=R=0),
there is a race condition between the two cross-coupled NAND
gates (ND1 and ND2) making Q and Q to linger around
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value. Although such race condition is prohibited during
normal circuit operation, it can influence the output to generate
a state determined by the mismatch in the underlying device
parameters (transistor length, threshold voltage). Analysis of the
race behavior is seemingly dependent on precise phase relation
between clock and input data. We exploit such input-referred
event sequence to generate PUF response.
s
EN=1
R
Q
Q’ND2
ND11
0
Fig. 1: SR Flip Flop
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Fig. 2: Architecture of dual-mode n-bit array SR FFs
Fig. 2 shows the architecture of n-bit array SR-FFs with
an input multiplexer (MUX) to select either PUF or regular
mode. As each SR-FF would generate a single bit key, we can
obtain a PUF signature of the maximum size of FF instances.
However, it suffers from multiplexer output that has to be
sufficiently long to reach all SR-FF instances. It would also
increase the delay to produce random output at Q depending on
the longest distance from MUX output to an SR-FF instance.
As a result, both higher wire length from MUX output and
longest transition time due to metastability would decrease the
timing performance of an SR-FF based PUF during regular
operation. Furthermore, such architecture may be susceptible
to key-guessing attack under a single clock pulse. Hence, the
architecture in Fig. 2 would be biased towards variations in the
connecting wire length and width. This, in turn, reduces the
impact of transistors’ local variation. In short, the higher the
depth of PUF timing paths, the less its response would depend
on transistors behavior.
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Fig. 3: Centroid of 16-bit SR Flip-Flops
Fig. 3 shows a centroid architecture (4x4 grid) of 16-bit
SR-FFs built upon Fig. 2 with additional MUXs to improve
the delay and thwarting the key-guessing attack. It also results
in improved bit distribution by preventing edge-effects [11].
Each multiplexer has three selector bit, of which, two would
be used to select an SR-FF in a grid and the remaining would
TABLE I: Specifications of wireload model in three design
corners (cap. unit, fF and res. unit, KΩ)
Wireload Model
Best Typical Worst
Cap. Res. Cap. Res. Cap. Res.
8000 0.00028 1.42E-03 0.000312 1.57E-03 0.000343 1.73E-03
16000 0.000512 1.15E-03 0.000569 1.28E-03 0.000625 1.41E-03
35000 0.000243 1.07E-03 0.00027 1.19E-03 0.000297 1.31E-03
70000 0.000128 9.00E-03 0.000143 1.00E-02 0.000157 1.10E-02
TABLE II: Wire specifications across all wireload models in
three design corners
Wire width (0.45, 0.9, 1.35, 1.8, 2.25)
Wire Spacing
(0.45, 0.9, 1.35, 1.8, 2.25, 2.7, 3.15, 3.6,
4.05, 4.5, 4.95, 5.4, 5.85, 6.3, 6.75, 7.2)
determine mode (PUF or normal) selection. A simple controller
is embedded in the original architecture to aid in the signal
extraction process. Depending on the number of controllable
MUXs, the size of the partitions can increase or decrease.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We perform Monte Carlo (MC) simulations of SR-FF PUF
at SPICE level using Synopsys HSPICE for three CMOS
processes (90nm, 45nm, and 32nm) [12]. MC can perform
device variability analysis within six-sigma limit, hence the
Challenges-Response Pairs (CRPs) collected using MC is com-
parable to CRPs from manufactured ICs. We simulate the PUF
structure for 1000 iterations, analogous to 1000 different dies
on a 300mm wafer at nominal voltage (1V). Several works [2],
[13], [14] in the literature have validated PUF design through
SPICE level simulations. We then evaluate PUF responses
according to the parameters proposed by Maiti et al. [15].
Although process variations impact the channel length, we
maintain length variability within (intra-die) 15% and across
(inter-die) 33% of nominal value to generate CRPs [16]. We
also report the performance overhead of physical synthesis for
five RTL designs [17] with centroid architecture.
Uniqueness: Uniqueness provides the measurement of inter-
chip variation. We can measure the uniqueness by calculating
Hamming Distance (HD) of two pair-wise dies. Ideally, two
dies (chips) show a distinguishable response (HD ∼ 50%) to
a common challenge. Fig. 4(a-c) shows inter-chip HD of four
different key sequences. For all keys, we made two thousand
comparisons to verify uniqueness. One can see that the average
HD for all key-lengths are close to 49%.
Reliability: We can measure the reliability from Bit Error
Rate (BER) of PUF responses for intra-chip variation. Ideally,
a PUF should maintain the same response (100% reliable or 0%
variation) on different environmental variations (supply voltage,
temperature) under the same challenge. Fig. 4(d-f) shows the
intra-die HD for five key length in three process nodes different
temperature (0oC to 80oC). The reliability (HD = 0) for 16-,
32-, 64-, and 128-bit registers are 92.3%, 92.2%, 90.7%, and
92.7% respectively.
Uniformity/Randomness: Uniformity measures the ability
of a PUF to generate uncorrelated ‘0’s and ‘1’s in the response.
Ideally, PUF should generate ‘0’s and ‘1’s with equal probabil-
ity in a response. This ensures the resilience of guessing PUF
response from a known challenge. The probability of zero is
bound within 0.5 and 0.7 for four different key lengths in Fig.
5. Although the ideal value of uniform probability should be
0.5, variability in gate delay due to process variability impacts
the even distribution of ‘0’s and ‘1’s.
Bit aliasing/Response collision: To evaluate the bit aliasing,
we use the same set of responses used in uniqueness. We see
the average probability of collision less than 30% as shown
in Fig. 6. As the reference response is chosen randomly and
compared to the rest of the responses, an adversary can guess,
on average, less than 30% of the correct responses. Hence, the
generated responses are resistant to the key-guessing attack.
Physical Synthesis Analysis: We report the physical syn-
thesis results of designs from OpenCores [17]. We perform the
logic synthesis with Synopsys Design Compiler and the layout
(floor planning, placement, and routing) of the mapped netlist
using Synopsys IC Compiler. We evaluate the area, power, and
timing overhead for SAED 90nm technology in three design
corners, namely, best, typical and worst.
Table I lists the required resistance and capacitance (routing
and parasitic) values during cell characterization for achieve-
ing metastable state. The inter-transistor routing across all
wireload models are presented in Table II. The capacitance
values include both routing and parasitic capacitance. We vary
input voltages (0.7V-1.32V) with (on_chip_variation)
enabled during synthesis. It confirms that the responses are not
biased towards a particular input voltage value and adversary
can not further tamper the device responses with aggressive
supply voltage changes. We maintain a 4by4 grid across all
designs to implement centroid architecture and distribute it
randomly. Depending on the dimension of the grid, the total
number of the grid would grow or shrink. Following that, we
report the overhead after physical synthesis in Table III. The
number of bits in Table III represent the possible key length of
design. Across different wireload models of a particular design
corner, we observe more delay and power variations due to
variable resistance and capacitance. For 8-bit uP, the centroid
architecture is adjacent to high-activity logic, hence we see
increased PPA overhead. In the remaining designs, best-case
minimizes the area and delay overhead and during worst-case,
we see a reduction in power overhead.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed to use the existing SR
flip-flop in the design to quantify its race condition for PUF
implementation. We embed a centroid architecture with SR FFs
so that PUF responses conform to local transistor variations
only. The generated responses exhibit better uniqueness, ran-
domness, reliability and reduced bit-aliasing compared to other
metastability-based PUFs. For future work, we would evaluate
the uniqueness of SR-FF PUF responses from transient noise
based simulation and the resilience against adversarial machine
learning attack.
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